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ABSTRACT 
  At the dawn of the twenty-first century, a flurry of media reports 
revealed that pervasive corporate and accounting scandals were 
infecting U.S. financial markets. As investors panicked and stock 
prices plummeted, a determined Congress scrambled to restore order 
by ushering in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the most exacting regulatory 
imposition on corporate America since the Great Depression. 
Burdened with the Act’s enormous administrative and transactional 
costs, many corporations pulled their shares from U.S. markets and 
relocated them to exchanges in nations with less onerous governance 
strictures. This exodus has deeply concerned many U.S. political, 
financial, and legal commentators, who argue that the American 
corporate governance regime must be revamped to resemble the less 
burdensome and principles-based soft law structure that operates in 
countries like the United Kingdom. This Note assesses the viability of 
such an overhaul. It ultimately concludes that given the longstanding 
and singularly American predilection for rules-based regulation and 
litigation, any large-scale transplant of soft law principles into U.S. 
corporate governance is a practical impossibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By the end of August 2002, it was clear something was rotten in 
the state of corporate America.1 In less than ten months’ time Enron 
had collapsed,2 WorldCom had imploded,3 and federal investigators 
had uncovered large-scale corporate and accounting imbroglios at 
nineteen other major exchange-traded companies.4 As reports of 
unprecedented malfeasance and fraud poured from media outlets at 
an extraordinary rate,5 alarmed investors abandoned public securities 
markets in droves.6 
An alarmed Congress was likewise quick to react, hastening to 
draft the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002, commonly called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
after its principal legislative sponsors.7 With eleven titles and nearly 
150 pages of text, Sarbanes-Oxley is replete with regulatory 
prescriptions that compel public companies to beef up their internal 
controls and overhaul their governance structures.8 It also directs the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to draft a vast body of 
 
 1. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1, sc. 4, l. 90 (Joseph 
Quincy Adams ed., Riverside Press 1929). 
 2. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Collapses as Suitor Cancels Plans 
for Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at A1. 
 3. See Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, July 
22, 2002, at A1 (reporting that WorldCom, after once listing more than $107 billion in assets, 
submitted the largest bankruptcy filing in United States history). 
 4. Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES, Aug. 26, 2002, http://www. 
forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Will Hutton, Bye Bye American Pie, THE OBSERVER (London), June 30, 2002, 
at 25 (commenting that the United States was struck with “an orgy of unprecedented corporate 
fraud, plunder and malfeasance that has demanded the connivance of its most reputable 
accounting firms, business leaders and banks”); Gary Strauss, How Did Business Get So Darn 
Dirty?, USA TODAY, June 12, 2002, at 1B (observing that although “[g]reed and corruption 
have always lingered at the edges of Corporate America, . . . . the new millennium . . . ushered in 
a wave of fraud, corporate malfeasance, investment scams, ethical lapses and conflicts of interest 
unprecedented in scope”). 
 6. Editorial, Stock Market Blues, MIAMI HERALD, July 21, 2002, at 6L (“Spooked by 
recent corporate scandals, investors have sent U.S. stocks tumbling into one of the worst market 
dives in three decades.”). 
 7. John Paul Lucci, Enron—The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the 
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003) (“[Sarbanes-Oxley] 
became law a mere seven months after Enron filed for bankruptcy.”); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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implementing rules9 that fill more than three thousand pages.10 
Collectively, these requirements—and the nearly $2 million in 
operational costs and legal fees Sarbanes-Oxley annually imposes on 
many companies11—have led commentators to denounce it as the 
most heavy-handed regulatory imposition on public corporations in 
more than seventy years.12 
An increasing number of corporations have therefore chosen to 
take their business outside the United States, where regulatory 
oversight is less stringent and compliance costs are less exorbitant.13 
Their exodus has exacted a heavy toll on the once preeminent U.S. 
capital markets, which have slipped behind Europe and Asia on key 
indicators of economic vitality.14 Sarbanes-Oxley’s many critics have  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (Supp. V 2005) (“The [SEC] shall promulgate such rules and 
regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of this Act.”). 
 10. Silvia Ascarelli, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: In Europe, Corporate-Governance Rules Are 
Not in the Details, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R6 (“[W]hile the U.S. has turned to explicit 
rules—3,000 pages written by the SEC to flesh out the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and still going—
many other countries have let industry lay out new guidelines and left enforcement to peer 
pressure.”). 
 11. Adrian Michaels, Companies Balk at Cost of Compliance, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 
12, 2004, at 25; see also What’s Wrong with Wall Street, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 11, 11 
(“[Sarbanes-Oxley] greatly increased the reporting burden on companies.”). 
 12. E.g., Symposium, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 
MERCER L. REV. 731, 732 (2003) (inquiry of Michael Rosenzweig) (labeling Sarbanes-Oxley 
“the most sweeping federal regulation of public corporations since the federal securities laws 
were enacted some seventy years ago”); Justin O’Brien, The Politics of Symbolism: Sarbanes-
Oxley in Context, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 9, 
9 (Paul U. Ali & Greg N. Gregoriou eds., 2006) (observing that Sarbanes-Oxley has been both 
heralded and denigrated “as the most far-reaching change to the governance of corporations 
and the markets in which they operate since the 1930s”). 
 13. See Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C1 (discussing the increasing number of foreign corporations that are 
delisting from U.S. stock markets and deregistering with the SEC to escape mounting Sarbanes-
Oxley compliance costs). 
 14. See, e.g., Down on the Street, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 69, 70 (reporting that the 
New York Stock Exchange’s share of initial public offerings, as measured by proceeds, has been 
surpassed by both London and Hong Kong). 
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been quick to take notice15 and have called for a significant trimming 
of its vast web of regulatory red tape.16 
Even more importantly, a growing number of business 
executives, political leaders, and legal observers view Sarbanes-Oxley 
as part of a much larger problem, namely the entire rules-based 
system of U.S. corporate governance.17 They advocate far-reaching 
legislative and administrative measures18 that would strip the U.S. 
regulatory regime of its rules-based structure, which they perceive as 
hopelessly “complex,” “murky,” and “harder to understand and 
harder to follow” than more flexible regimes in other nations.19 In its 
place, they propose adopting a more principles-based approach, 
similar to the regime operating in the United Kingdom under its 
 
 15. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1589 (2005) (criticizing Sarbanes-Oxley for creating 
regulations that burden corporations with debilitating transaction costs that drive them out of 
the United States); William A. Niskanen, Enron’s Last Victim: American Markets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2007, at A21 (“[Sarbanes-Oxley] has proven counterproductive in the extreme. . . . [It] 
has seriously harmed American corporations and financial markets without increasing investor 
confidence . . . . [and has] created an expensive and arguably unconstitutional new regulatory 
agency to regulate the audit firms’ activities.”); see also Ascarelli, supra note 10 (“The U.S. 
emphasis on detailed rules has perplexed many European political and business leaders, who 
criticize Sarbanes-Oxley as poorly written legislation drafted in haste.”); Special Report: The 
Rules of the Game, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2007, at 16, 18 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley is “often 
blamed for making America a less attractive place for doing business”). 
 16. See What’s Wrong with Wall Street, supra note 11, at 11 (observing that many critics 
have argued that “America is also responsible for its financial markets’ decline by tangling them 
up in red tape. Nowhere is this clearer than the Sarbanes-Oxley act . . . .”). 
 17. See COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 
(2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com/portal/capmarkets/default.htm 
(advocating “quick and decisive adjustments in the U.S. legal and regulatory framework”); Tom 
Bawden, Bush Says Sarbanes Hurts US Markets, TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 2007, at 53 (discussing 
President George W. Bush’s belief that overregulation of American capital markets has 
damaged the U.S. economy); Jeremy Grant, Bernanke Calls for US to Follow UK’s “Principles-
Based” Approach, FIN. TIMES (London), May 16, 2007, at 1 (reporting Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s concern that the rules-based system of regulation is no longer 
suitable for American markets). 
 18. See MANSOOR DAILAMI, WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE VOLUME 
I: REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND OUTLOOK 101 (2007) (“Recognizing the advantages of the 
European approach [to corporate governance], in 2006 the U.S. Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation recommended a more principles-based approach to regulation to enhance 
shareholder rights while reducing overly burdensome regulations and litigation.”). 
 19. Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in Corporate Governance, N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS., Fall 2004, at 219, 229. 
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Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Combined Code).20 In 
contrast to Sarbanes-Oxley, the Combined Code incorporates a set of 
guiding principles—rather than copious lists of exhaustive rules—that 
are designed to keep corporate abuses in check.21 
By highlighting specific differences in U.S. and U.K. regulation 
of audit committee financial experts as a point of reference, this Note 
examines the feasibility of exchanging the rules-based regime of U.S. 
corporate governance for a principles-based replacement akin to the 
Combined Code. Due to several dominant historical and cultural 
threads woven deep into the fabric of a uniquely American legal 
ethos, this Note concludes that any significant shift toward a more 
principles-based regime would be short-lived. 
Part I defines the scope of the problem, highlighting key 
differences between the U.S. and U.K. regulatory systems and 
describing the arguments of those who have called for dramatic 
change to the U.S. system. Part II focuses more specifically on the 
Combined Code and its theoretical and practical dissonance with the 
U.S. scheme for regulating corporate governance. Particular emphasis 
is given to essential differences in U.K. and U.S. enforcement and 
ideology, as well as the differences in each nation’s regulation of audit 
committees and financial experts. Part III illustrates the significant 
roles U.S. history and culture have played in the cultivation of rules-
based regulation, including the roles they continue to play in 
cementing its perpetuity. Finally, this Note concludes that these 
cultural and historical forces are ultimately both too firmly fixed and 
too transcendent to accommodate any large-scale adoption of 
principles-based regulation into U.S. law. Indeed, even if such an 
adoption were theoretically possible, a principles-based regime in the 
United States would have no viable chance of long-term survival. 
 
 20. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006) [hereinafter COMBINED CODE], available at http://www.frc.org.uk/ 
corporate/combinedcode.cfm (follow the “Combined Code June 2006” hyperlink). 
 21. See BOB GARRATT, THIN ON TOP: WHY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS AND 
HOW TO MEASURE AND IMPROVE BOARD PERFORMANCE 21 (2003) (asserting that any 
“notion of there being a single, integrated Anglo/US governance model is untrue” because “US 
and UK corporate governance practices are significantly different—especially in their approach 
to compliance issues”). 
04__ANDERSON.DOC 4/16/2008  8:35:11 AM 
1086 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1081 
I.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Comprehensive sets of prophylactic rules have long been the sine 
qua non of U.S. corporate regulation. For reasons rooted partly in 
U.S. social and economic history,22 congressional efforts to curtail 
corporate fraud have customarily been marked by copious bright-line 
tests, elaborate compilations of rules, multiple exceptions for each 
rule, and a high level of regulatory detail23 intended to provide a clear 
answer to every possible situation and to address all conceivable 
eventualities.24 
For example, in the 1970s Congress countered the pervasive 
foreign bribery and corporate political contribution scandals by 
enacting the rules-saturated Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).25 
To the dismay of many public company executives,26 the FCPA 
mandated a costly overhaul of all corporate auditing programs, 
including the implementation of a more rigorous system of internal 
accounting controls.27 Similarly, in response to the shocking insider 
trading scandals of the 1980s, Congress adopted the intricate and 
“woefully . . . confusing”28 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
 
 22. See infra Part III; see also Coglianese et al., supra note 19, at 219 (“[M]uch of the 
existing system of corporate regulation in the United States emerged in response to vagaries of 
the late 1920s and the subsequent stock market crash.”); Jeremy Grant, Paulson Vows to Bolster 
US Competitiveness, FT.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eb34ca58-d19f-11db-
b921-000b5df10621.html (commenting that the U.S. “‘rules-based’ system [was] forged in the 
post-Depression years of investor protection”). 
 23. William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the United States, in 
AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION 
IN EUROPE AND THE US 265, 271 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006); see 
GARRATT, supra note 21, at 21 (stating that rules support the quintessentially U.S. 
“emphasis . . . on external agencies ensuring compliance and, if necessary, litigation”). 
 24. Coglianese et al., supra note 19, at 229. 
 25. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 1 (1982) (“The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 has been characterized as the most extensive application of 
federal law to the regulation of corporations since the passage of the 1933 and 1934 securities 
acts.”). 
 26. Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a 
Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 189 (1994) (“From the instant the [Foreign 
Corrupt Practices] Act was implemented, American corporations complained about the Act’s 
provisions and clamored for amendment.”). 
 27. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 144 (2006). 
 28. JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 65 
(1991). 
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Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).29 Like Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
FCPA, the ITSFEA has been criticized for both its severity and its 
abstruse impenetrability.30 
This approach is anathema to the regulatory approach in many 
nations, including the United Kingdom. Following the failures at 
Enron and WorldCom, the Financial Reporting Council,31 an 
independent regulatory panel staffed with British corporate 
luminaries, issued an important soft law32 document titled “The 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance.”33 The Combined Code 
 
 29. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 
102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter “Exchange Act”] by adding §§ 21A(a)(3) and (b)(1)). 
The insider trading scandals of the early 1980s led more immediately to Congress’ enactment of 
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. James D. Cox, The Role of Empirical Evidence in 
Evaluating the Wisdom of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006). The Act 
“authorize[d] the SEC to impose a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profits made 
or losses avoided by any person who violated the antifraud rules by inside trading or tipping.” 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, with the assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement 
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 745 n.25 (2003). However, the Act failed to 
prevent two highly-publicized scandals in the mid-1980s involving, respectively, Dennis Levine 
and Ivan Boesky. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Wages Even Wall St. Can’t Stomach, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 1989, at D1 (“Mr. Boesky, the envy of Wall Street in 1985, when he made an estimated 
$100 million, paid that much to settle insider trading charges the following year.”); Nathanial C. 
Nash, An Insider Scheme Is Put in Millions, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1986, at A1 (“A Wall Street 
merger specialist [Dennis Levine . . .] was charged today with using confidential information 
illegally in a trading scheme that reaped at least $12.6 million in profits . . . .”). In response to 
these (and other) scandals, Congress quickly enacted more sweeping regulation with the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, 
at 7 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (“The [ITSFEA] represents the 
response of this Committee to a series of revelations over the last two years concerning serious 
episodes of abusive and illegal practices on Wall Street.”). 
 30. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 
1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 608 (observing that Congress passed ITSFEA after “fram[ing] insider 
trading as an issue of immorality and punishment . . . of good versus evil,” which allowed it to 
place excessive liability on defendants in a way that was draconian). Further, because the 
ITSFEA “increased penalties for ‘insider trading’ without defining [insider trading]” itself, it has 
drawn broad criticism for being incomplete and confusing. Id. 
 31. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 4 (2006), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate (follow “The UK 
Approach to Corporate Governance” hyperlink). The Council declares that “[t]he UK’s system 
of business regulation, which is principles rather than rules based, reduces the cost to global 
businesses of introducing procedures to comply with detailed regulations, many of which 
unnecessarily constrain business practice and innovation.” Id. at 1. 
 32. “‘[S]oft law[s,]’ [broadly defined, are] those regulatory instruments and mechanisms of 
governance that, while implicating some kind of normative commitment, do not rely on binding 
rules or on a regime of formal sanctions.” Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 499, 499 (2006). 
 33. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20. 
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proposes a small number of recommended “best practices” and 
compels companies wishing to list on the London Stock Exchange34 to 
comply, or alternatively, to state their reasons for noncompliance in 
their annual reports.35 If companies choose noncompliance, it is 
assumed investors will either accept the noncompliance or pressure 
those companies to conform—by voting their shares or by selling 
their shares in the open market.36 Hence, the principles-based system 
is essentially shareholder regulated.37 
Principles-based regulation has drawn praise from many 
influential U.S. political and business leaders who view the rules-
based system as a sort of millstone around the neck of U.S. capital 
markets. For example, in January 2007, President George W. Bush 
cautioned that legislative rulemaking had created “excessive litigation 
and overregulation [that] threaten to make our capital markets less 
attractive to investors, especially in the face of rising competition 
from capital markets abroad.”38 Shortly thereafter, a bipartisan 
commission established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
recommended “quick and decisive adjustments in the U.S. legal and 
regulatory framework,”39 including a shift to a more principles-based 
system focused on “providing informal guidance to market 
participants . . . that . . . do[es] not require rulemaking.”40 The 
commission gravely observed, “[I]t has become increasingly clear that 
the United States lacks an overall vision for how its legal and 
regulatory framework should respond to . . . new market 
developments.”41 In May 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke urged that the U.S. turn away from its traditional rules-
based regulation and candidly advocated “a consistent, principles-
 
 34. JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 306 (2005). 
 35. Id.; John Friedland, Reforming Disclosure and Corporate Governance in the UK: 
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 1 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 35, 36 (2003). 
 36. Ascarelli, supra note 10. 
 37. See NEIL COWAN, RISK ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 99 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that the 
United Kingdom’s enforcement is “market-led and driven by stakeholder groups who will 
enforce good governance by ‘voting with their feet’ in respect of withdrawing financial support 
from companies that do not follow the voluntary code”). 
 38. Bawden, supra note 17. 
 39. COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 17, at 4. 
 40. Id. at 7. 
 41. Id. at 11. 
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based, and risk-focused approach” similar to the one used in the 
United Kingdom.42  
Still, others have advocated caution in considering these calls for 
change. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., has publicly 
recommended an examination of “whether it would be practically 
possible and beneficial to move toward a more principles-based 
regulatory system,” given that rules-based regulation “has served [the 
United States] very well over the course of [its] history. . . . [and] is 
part of the foundation for [its] prosperity and growth.”43 Paulson’s 
concern forms the basis for this Note, which investigates whether it is 
practical and beneficial to adopt a more principles-based regulatory 
framework into U.S. corporate governance. 
II.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Although U.S. and U.K. approaches to corporate regulation are 
fundamentally different, they also share some areas of common 
ground. This Part describes both their essential differences and their 
similarities. 
A. Essential Differences 
Why is it unfeasible to adopt a principles-based regime of 
corporate governance into U.S. law? There are at least two general 
reasons. First, such an adoption is hampered by several key and 
essential differences that distinguish the U.S. approach to corporate 
governance from its U.K. counterpart. This Section discusses those 
differences, which are—at their essence—differences in enforcement 
and ideology. Second, as Part III discusses, a uniquely American 
history and legal culture play a fundamental role in cementing the 
preeminence of rules in U.S. corporate governance. 
 
 42. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Speech to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2007 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Ga. 
(May 15, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2007 
0515a.htm. 
 43. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Opening Remarks at Treasury’s Capital 
Markets Competitiveness Conference at Georgetown Univ. (Mar. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp306.htm. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementing rules grant the SEC44—and 
arguably private citizens45—authority to enforce the Act’s provisions 
through litigation. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has no corporate 
governance legislation whatsoever and therefore no comparable lever 
to pry open the courthouse doors.46 Instead, the London Stock 
Exchange—a self-regulatory organization—simply requires U.K.-
listed companies to comply with the Combined Code’s recommended 
principles or to explain publicly why they do not comply.47 This public 
reporting presumably allows investors themselves to promote 
conscientious corporate governance by choosing to invest with those 
companies that practice it and to pull their funds from those that do 
not.48 This enforcement regime may punish corporate misdeeds in the 
marketplace but it does not punish them in the courtroom. 
A narrower enforcement distinction arises from the differing 
degrees of auditor flexibility allowed by the governance structures of 
each country. In the United States, Sarbanes-Oxley makes it unlawful 
for an audit firm to engage in any of eight specific types of nonaudit 
services contemporaneous with its audit of a public company.49 This 
regulation is intended to safeguard the audit firm’s independence and 
 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a), (b)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (“The [SEC] shall promulgate such rules 
and regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of this Act. . . . A 
violation . . . [of] any rule or regulation of the [SEC] issued under this Act . . . shall be treated 
for all purposes in the same manner as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”). 
 45. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Implied Private Actions Under Sarbanes-
Oxley, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 775, 776, 805 (2004) (contending that Sarbanes-Oxley “contains 
a number of provisions expressly granting private parties the right to sue for violations of the 
Act” and creates “additional duties and obligations . . . [that] provide fuel for new implied 
private actions”). But see PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 105 (2003) (“There is no new private right of action for investors 
created by Sarbanes-Oxley.”). MacAvoy and Millstein affirm however that Sarbanes-Oxley 
“permit[s a] private right of action to recover profits improperly obtained by insiders during 
pension fund black out periods” and requires “certain certifications . . . [that] could provide the 
basis of a private action.” Id. at 105 n.20. 
 46. COWAN, supra note 37, at 98. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 99. 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. V 2005) (listing these services as “(1) bookkeeping or 
other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) 
financial information systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, 
fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit 
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; (7) broker or dealer, 
investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal services and expert services 
unrelated to the audit”). Also prohibited are any services that the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, established by 15 U.S.C. § 7211, determines are impermissible. Id. 
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preempt foreseeable conflicts of interest with the audited firm.50 
Unfortunately, it may also burden the audited firm with the 
additional expense of hiring multiple companies to provide multiple 
services. The auditing firm could likely provide the nonaudit services 
less expensively than any of these other companies by virtue of the 
understanding gained through its audit of the client.51 
In the United Kingdom, the Auditing Practices Board (APB), 
which is part of the Financial Reporting Council, is charged with 
establishing auditing standards that instill confidence in the auditing 
process.52 It has developed a more flexible approach to non-audit 
activities than the eight Sarbanes-Oxley categories by issuing a form 
of guidance called the “APB Ethical Standard: Non-Audit Services 
Provided to Audit Clients.”53 Among other things, the “APB Ethical 
Standard” suggests that if a lead auditor detects a possible or actual 
breach of one of its provisions, that auditor should “assess the 
implications of the breach, determine whether there are safeguards 
that can be put in place or other actions that can be taken to address 
any potential adverse consequences and consider whether there is a 
need to resign from the audit engagement.”54 Authority for 
enforcement thus rests with the auditor, not with an outside legal 
entity.55 
The United States and the United Kingdom also approach 
corporate governance from opposite ideological angles, as indicated 
by official statements about the purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Combined Code respectively. Sarbanes-Oxley was expressly created 
“[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
 
 50. Paul Davies, Enron and Corporate Governance Reform in the UK and the European 
Community, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES 
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US, supra note 23, at 415, 432. 
 51. Id. 
 52. The Auditing Practices Board Home Page, http://www.frc.org.uk/apb/ (last visited Jan. 
19, 2008). 
 53. AUDITING PRACTICES BD., APB ETHICAL STANDARD 5: NON-AUDIT SERVICES 
PROVIDED TO AUDIT CLIENTS (2004), available at www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ 
ES5vprint.pdf. 
 54. Id. para. 3. 
 55. The authority of APB pronouncements is slightly—but only slightly—more substantial 
than is indicated here, as auditing firms in Britain must register with supervisory administrative 
bodies and these bodies have been included to adopt APB standards and guidance as a 
requirement for the firms registered with them. See AUDITING PRACTICES BD., THE AUDITING 
PRACTICES BOARD–SCOPE AND AUTHORITY OF PRONOUNCEMENTS (REVISED) para. 12 
(2006), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ (follow “The Auditing 
Practices Board - Scope and Authority of Pronouncements _Revised_ 2006.pdf” hyperlink). 
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corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.”56 The 
legislative focus was explicitly on augmenting corporate reporting—
which simultaneously increases corporate transaction costs—to 
restore investor confidence and to safeguard the integrity of U.S. 
markets.57 This “rules and enforcement first” approach not only 
“made the whole business of operating a company in the United 
States a lot more tiresome,”58 it also made it much more expensive, 
with Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs reportedly reaching 
approximately $6 billion in 2006.59 Studies indicate that these forces 
are driving securities issuers away from the United States.60 
Conversely, flexibility is the touchstone of the Combined Code61 
and the British have allowed the more fluid forces of the capital 
markets to dictate the ways corporations choose to govern 
themselves.62 The Combined Code’s stated purpose is to “enabl[e] 
UK listed companies to be led in a way which facilitates 
entrepreneurial success and the management of risk.”63 Important 
emphasis is placed on “entrepreneurial success” and corporate 
profitability, not on costly legal disclosures and protective 
 
 56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 57. Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) (statement of William H. 
Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). Sarbanes-Oxley’s principal 
objectives “can be grouped into the following themes: [t]o strengthen and restore confidence in 
the accounting profession; [t]o strengthen enforcement of the Federal securities laws; [t]o 
improve the ‘tone at the top’ and executive responsibility; [t]o improve disclosure and financial 
reporting; and [t]o improve the performance of ‘gatekeepers.’” Id. 
 58. James Harding, London Calling, TIMES ONLINE (London), Mar. 13, 2007, http:// 
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article1503880.ece. 
 59. Deepak Gopinath, Why the Big Deals No Longer Call Wall Street Home, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 21, 2007, at B15. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK para. 3.10 (2000) (observing that the 
United Kingdom’s corporate system’s flexibility is a “great strength,” which is likely to prove a 
major competitive advantage in the marketplace); PETRI MÄNTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS AS A RULE-MAKER 86 (2005) (stating that “UK 
company law is regarded as flexible”); Andrew Hurst, London Keeps Edge Over Wall St. for 
Now, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/InvestmentBanking06/idUSL168 
2039720061116 (“Speakers at a Reuters Investment Banking Summit singled out for praise 
Britain’s principles-based system of market regulation . . . .”).  
 62. Ascarelli, supra note 10. 
 63. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE COMBINED CODE 
1 (2007), available at http://www.frrp.co.uk/press/pub1299.html (follow “Consultation Paper: 
Review of the Impact of the Combined Code” hyperlink). 
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mechanisms to safeguard investors. Some commentators believe that 
this company-friendly focus has allowed London to surpass New 
York as the world’s most vibrant economic center.64 
B. Audit Committees and Financial Experts 
Despite these contrasting enforcement mechanisms and 
ideologies, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Combined Code share certain 
patches of common regulatory ground, especially with regard to 
corporate audit committees. This Section describes the contours of 
that common ground. 
1. Audit Committees.  Audit committees in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom are generally structured in the same 
fashion and serve the same functions. All committee members must 
be independent non-executive directors.65 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
audit committee is legally accountable for appointing, compensating, 
and overseeing the work of the outside auditor.66 Under the 
Combined Code, however, the committee “should . . . review and 
monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process,”67 but “no regulatory enforcement 
proceeding or class action is prompted by non-compliance.”68 Indeed, 
although corporations in the United Kingdom are directed by the 
Combined Code to comply with its provisions or explain their reasons 
for noncompliance,69 no legal penalties arise from their failure to 
comply with or explain any of these provisions unless the corporation 
is listed on a U.K. stock exchange. If a corporation is listed, and it 
 
 64. See Hurst, supra note 61 (“Britain’s flexible financial regulatory regime is giving 
London a strong edge over New York, especially in attracting foreign company listings, and 
there is no sign Wall Street can close the gap soon.”). 
 65. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2005) (“Each member of the audit 
committee . . . shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be 
independent.”), with COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.1 (“The board should establish an 
audit committee of . . . members, who should all be independent non-executive directors.”). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2). 
 67. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.2 (emphasis added). 
 68. Thomas J. Dougherty, The Political Economy of Corporations: Varying Approaches to 
Corporate Governance Around the World (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education Course of 
Study, May 4–5, 2006), WL SL085 ALI-ABA 253, 256. 
 69. See COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, pmbl. at 1 (stating that “the company has either 
to confirm that it complies with the Code’s provisions or—where it does not—to provide an 
explanation”). 
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fails to comply or explain, it may be subject to prosecution under the 
U.K. Listing Authority.70 
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the audit 
committee serves a policing role to ensure that those managing 
corporate affairs comply with accepted accounting principles.71 This 
safeguard gives shareholders and investors increased confidence in a 
company’s reports about its financial health.72 Of course, at Enron, 
WorldCom, and other large U.S. corporations that have folded, 
breakdowns in the auditing process prevented shareholders from 
obtaining such accurate information.73 Auditors at these firms did not 
require strict management compliance with general accounting 
standards because their interests were entwined with those of the 
management.74 Under Sarbanes-Oxley and the Combined Code, 
members of a public company’s audit committee must be 
independent, meaning their interests are dissociated from those of 
corporate executives.75 
2. Financial Expertise under the Combined Code.  Although 
both Sarbanes-Oxley and the Combined Code also seek to provide a 
certain level of financial expertise on corporate audit committees, 
 
 70. Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance 
with the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 486, 488 n.11 (2006) (“[B]reach of the Listing 
Rules . . . can be sanctioned by public censure, fine or suspension from listing under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.”). 
 71. See JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW 
AND EXPLANATION 13 (2002) (stating that a goal is to “improve quality and transparency in 
financial reporting by those companies”); Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the 
Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 508 (2004) 
(stating that “[a]uditors ensure that the management complies with accounting standards”). 
 72. Matthew M. Benov, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxley: Accommodating 
Foreign Private Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 439, 
454–55 (2003) (“The United Kingdom drafted . . . the Combined Code . . . out of concern for 
maintaining integrity in financial reporting and boosting investor confidence.” (citation 
omitted)); Shirley, supra note 71, at 508. 
 73. See BROOKS CARDER & PATRICK RAGAN, MEASUREMENT MATTERS: HOW 
EFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT DRIVES BUSINESS AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE 124 (2005) (“Audited 
financial statements indicated that Enron, WorldCom, and Health South were making 
substantial profits at a time when they were in fact losing large amounts of money.”). 
 74. ANDREW D. CROCKETT, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INDUSTRY: WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THEM? 36 (2003). 
 75. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2005) (“Each member of the audit 
committee of the issuer . . . shall otherwise be independent.”), with COMBINED CODE, supra 
note 20, § C.3.1 (stating that the members of the audit committee “should all be independent 
non-executive directors”). 
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they approach this goal in different ways. The Combined Code 
showcases its flexibility in regulating corporations, stating that “[t]he 
board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit 
committee has recent and relevant financial experience.”76 Thus, even 
if the board decides to bring someone onto its audit committee whose 
financial expertise is limited to balancing a personal checkbook, the 
Combined Code only requires that the board feel satisfied that the 
experience is both recent and relevant. No one else must be satisfied. 
Under such a permissive standard, even if a corporation fails to put 
anyone with a moderate amount of financial experience on its audit 
committee, as long as it satisfies itself, no disclosure is required in the 
annual report. 
Moreover, shareholder discretion is the only policing mechanism 
provided by the Combined Code. No government or industry 
watchdog has authority to assess the extent of a financial expert’s 
expertise. Indeed, even if a provision bestowed such authority on an 
industry watchdog, it would have no objective standard for measuring 
whether a board member’s financial expertise was sufficient. All the 
Combined Code requires is that the corporation “satisfy itself.” This 
implies that the corporation must satisfy not only its directors, but 
also its owners—the shareholders—whom the Combined Code 
envisions as the real watchdogs of corporation. Because all 
shareholders have access to reports detailing the composition of the 
company’s audit committee,77 the Combined Code anticipates that 
these shareholders will regulate company behavior by either 
pressuring corporations to appoint someone with bona fide financial 
expertise to the audit committee or by moving their money 
elsewhere. 
3. Financial Expertise under the U.S. Regulations.  The 
numerous requirements and regulations imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley, 
the SEC rules, and the mandatory listing requirements of the major 
U.S. securities exchanges contrast sharply with the Combined Code’s 
flexible, principles-based and shareholder-regulated model. Because 
Sarbanes-Oxley directs SEC rulemaking with regard to audit 
committee financial experts, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules are 
 
 76. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.1 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. § A.1.2 (“The annual report should identify the chairman, the deputy chairman 
(where there is one), the chief executive, the senior independent director and the chairmen and 
members of the nomination, audit, and remuneration committees.”). 
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discussed together in the next Section. A description of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ listing requirements for 
financial experts follows. 
a. Sarbanes-Oxley and Associated SEC Regulations.  Sarbanes-
Oxley directs the SEC to enact rules defining the qualifications of an 
“audit committee financial expert.”78 Sarbanes-Oxley also requires 
each corporation to disclose in either its annual report or its annual 
shareholder proxy statement whether any member of its audit 
committee meets these qualifications.79 If a corporate audit committee 
has no financial expert, the company must explain why.80 If it does 
have an expert, the company must disclose the name of that expert.81 
Although on their surface the Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC 
provisions appear quite similar to the Combined Code provisions in 
that they both require companies to comply or explain their reasons 
for noncompliance, two key differences make the American rule-
based scheme more onerous on the companies it regulates. First, 
finding an audit committee member who meets the SEC’s high bar 
for financial expertise82 is much more difficult than finding one who 
meets the Combined Code’s simple “board should satisfy itself” 
requirement.83 Although the SEC has broadened the definition of 
financial expertise somewhat since its first draft, which would have 
excluded even former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a) (Supp. V 2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2003). The SEC’s 
elaborate definition spans seventy-five pages. Ascarelli, supra note 10. 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a). 
 80. Adam O. Emmerich et al., Composition of the Audit Committee: Ensuring Members 
Meet the New Independence and Financial Literacy Rules, 2 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & 
GOVERNANCE 67, 69 (2005).  
 81. Id. 
 82. The SEC’s corrected final rule implementing Sarbanes-Oxley section 407 requires that 
a financial expert have (i) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and 
financial statements; (ii) experience applying such principles in connection with the accounting 
for estimates, accruals, and reserves that are generally comparable to the estimates, accruals and 
reserves used in the registrant’s financial statements; experience preparing or auditing financial 
statements that present accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and 
complexity of issues expected to be raised by the registrant’s financial statements; (iii) 
experience with internal controls and the procedures for financial reporting; and (iv) an 
understanding of audit committee functions. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8177, 34-47235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 
(Jan. 23, 2003). 
 83. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.1. 
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and investing luminary Warren Buffett from qualifying as experts,84 
corporate chiefs continue to complain that recruiting qualified 
financial experts is a time-consuming hassle accompanied by high 
“explicit and implicit costs [that] arise in attracting and retaining such 
experts.”85 The SEC’s rules are “strict enough that even a highly 
competent person with a financial background might fail to qualify.”86 
Given that most of the Fortune 500 companies have already recruited 
qualified experts, a substantial part of the problem may be that the 
limited pool of qualified talent is drying up. 
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that each company must 
disclose the name of its financial expert has created its own unique set 
of problems. Many have questioned whether characterizing someone 
on the audit committee as an “expert” will bestow on that individual a 
higher standard of care than is assumed by other directors, thereby 
exposing the expert to increased liability. The SEC has attempted to 
assuage these anxieties by assuring financial experts that they are not 
subject to any liability, duties, or obligations above those traditionally 
assumed by other directors.87 The SEC even adopted a safe harbor to 
shield audit committee financial experts from liabilities arising under 
federal securities laws.88 
This safe harbor however, provides no refuge from plaintiffs 
filing suit under state securities laws, and such plaintiffs have already 
enjoyed a significant measure of success. For example, in In re 
Emerging Communications, Inc., Shareholders Litigation,89 
shareholders brought suit claiming the directors of the corporation 
had breached their fiduciary duty in connection with a merger 
negotiation.90 Because fiduciary duties are matters of state law and 
 
 84. Geoffrey Colvin, Sarbanes & Co. Can’t Want This, FORTUNE, Dec. 30, 2002, at 66, 66. 
(“Based on the language in [Sarbanes-Oxley], Alan Greenspan would not qualify as a financial 
expert. Warren Buffet apparently would not qualify either. The reason, essentially, is that 
neither man has been an accountant, an auditor, or a CFO, though it’s hard to imagine either 
man failing to lead an audit committee quite effectively.”). 
 85. Alan Reinstein, To the Rescue: The ACFE: Is it a Bird? A Plane? Alan Greenspan?, 
RMA J., Oct. 2004, at 62. 
 86. Bradley P. Cost & Daniel M. Miller, Emerging Communications: Enhanced Director 
Liability for Experts?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2005, at 26, available at http:// 
www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2005/January/26.pdf. 
 87. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407, supra note 82. 
 88. Id. 
 89. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). 
 90. Id. at *1. 
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not federal law, the SEC safe harbor was inapposite.91 The Delaware 
Chancery Court held one director to a higher standard of care than all 
the other directors because he was a financial expert, having gained 
specialized experience in both securities and the telecom industries.92 
This case has effectively put all other financial experts on notice that 
state courts may interpret the fiduciary obligations of experts to be 
greater than those of the other audit committee members. 
b. NYSE and NASDAQ Listing Requirements.  The listing 
requirements of the NYSE and NASDAQ likewise offer corporations 
less flexibility than the Combined Code, and in some respects they 
are even more restrictive than Sarbanes-Oxley. To be listed on either 
of these exchanges, a corporation must have a financial expert on its 
audit committee. There is no exception to this rule.93 In other words, 
the rule is not “comply or explain,” it is “comply or list elsewhere.” 
All issuers who list on the NYSE must have an independent director 
who serves on the audit committee as a financial expert, and the 
expert must possess “accounting or related financial management 
expertise.”94 A qualified financial expert must possess sufficient 
expertise to understand the most complex finance and accounting 
issues a company might encounter during the course of its business.95 
Similarly, the NASDAQ listing rules require company audit 
committees to have at least one member with “past employment 
experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional 
certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or 
background” that elevates that individual to a level of financial 
sophistication, such as experience as a chief executive officer or chief 
 
 91. See Cost & Miller, supra note 86 (“The safe harbor is meant to protect directors from 
extra liability under the federal securities laws. However, it is state law that imposes fiduciary 
duties upon directors . . . .”). 
 92. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (finding a financial expert 
culpable because he “possessed a specialized financial expertise, and an ability to understand 
ECM’s intrinsic value, that was unique to ECM board members”). 
 93. Emmerich et al., supra note 80, at 68 (noting that although the New York Stock 
Exchange does require at least one member of the committee to be financially literate, it also 
permits a corporation to be listed on the exchange even without such a member if the “audit 
committee member . . . become[s] financially literate within a reasonable period of time after 
being appointed to the audit committee”). 
 94. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a), http://www.nyse.com/regulation/ 
listed/1182508124422.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
 95. Emmerich et al., supra note 80, at 68. 
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financial officer.96 A company whose audit committee financial expert 
qualifies under the SEC rules also qualifies for purposes of the 
NASDAQ listing requirements.97 
When juxtaposed against the principles-oriented Combined 
Code, the NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules bring to light another 
important ideological principle that distinguishes U.S. corporate 
governance from its U.K. counterpart. Listing rules are essentially 
protective intermediaries. They stand at the gateway of the major 
exchanges to bar companies deemed most likely to harm investors.98 
For the NYSE and NASDAQ, those companies that do not have a 
qualified financial expert on their audit committee are barred from 
issuing securities. Conversely, the Combined Code allows any issuer 
to market its securities as long as it reports what is happening behind 
closed doors. The state ultimately places trust in shareholders and 
investors, who are empowered to look after their own interests, to do 
their own research, and to make investment decisions without 
intermediary gatekeepers. 
III.  UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES IN CONTEXT 
The ultimate question this Note seeks to address, and the one 
posed by many U.S. political and financial leaders, is whether it is 
feasible to transplant into U.S. law a more principles-based regulatory 
approach to corporate governance that is similar to and perhaps 
patterned after the Combined Code. To understand whether such 
dramatic changes in U.S. law are feasible—and if feasible, what they 
would look like in a legal and political system that has long been 
predominantly rules-based—it is useful to examine the genesis and 
evolution of the U.S. regulatory framework. It is likewise useful to 
assess the impact American culture has had and continues to have on 
U.S. corporate regulation. 
 
 96. NASDAQ Manual Online, Marketplace Rule 4350(d)(2)(A), http://nasdaq.complinet. 
com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1014 (last visited Jan. 27, 2008); 
accord Emmerich et al., supra note 80, at 69. 
 97. NASDAQ Manual Online, Marketplace Rule IM-4350-4, http://nasdaq.complinet.com/ 
nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1014 (follow the “IM-4350-4 Board 
Independence and Independent Committees” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
 98. See 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 22 (1981) (labeling 
the listing requirements of the securities exchanges the “gatekeepers of the path along which 
securities move to the public”). 
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However, because “culture can mean so many things,”99 and is 
susceptible to being “everywhere invoked and nowhere explained,”100 
it is first necessary to briefly define the meaning of “culture” used 
here. Borrowing from “the dominant paradigm” of culture that has 
emerged from cultural studies,101 this Note defines “culture” as “both 
the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups 
and classes, [based on] their given historical conditions and 
relationships . . . and as the lived traditions and practices through 
which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and . . . embodied.”102 As 
Gunther Teubner points out, cultural differences between nations 
complicate legal transfer and may lead to its failure, for “legal 
transfer is not smooth and simple but has to be assimilated to the 
deep structure of the new law, to the social world constructions that 
are unique to the different legal culture.”103 This Note argues that the 
uniquely American culture that has fostered rules-based corporate 
governance will resist and spurn the adoption of a soft law, principles-
based regime to regulate corporate behavior. 
This Part assesses the respective roles of both history and culture 
in the formation and perpetuation of U.S. rules-based corporate 
regulation. It then draws several comparative connections with the 
development of the United Kingdom’s principles-based scheme. 
A. Historical Influences 
Early American colonists arrived in the New World feeling a 
tremendous sense of distrust for corporate enterprise.104 Since early in 
the eighteenth century, the English middle and lower classes had 
been subject to widespread abuse and degradation at the hands of 
profit-thirsty corporations that emerged during the Industrial 
 
 99. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 35 (2001) (explaining that 
culture can mean “collective identity, nation, race, corporate policy, civilization, arts and letters, 
lifestyle, mass-produced popular artifacts, [and] ritual”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A 
READER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 520, 527 (Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley & 
Sherry B. Ortner eds., 1994) (emphasis omitted). 
 102. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 103. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 19 (1998). 
 104. JOHN DAVID ROSE, RESCUING CAPITALISM FROM CORPORATISM: GREED AND THE 
AMERICAN CORPORATE CULTURE 9 (2005). 
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Revolution.105 Poor children were often delivered in batches of fifty to 
one hundred to factory owners who whipped them, imprisoned them 
in irons, and forced them to work up to eighteen hours a day.106 
Even after arriving in the colonies, British settlers were 
frequently exposed to the excesses of industrialist corporate greed. 
The Crown routinely exploited the American colonies by making 
them a nonconsenting market for English goods. It forced the 
colonists to buy more than they were able to sell, thereby 
exacerbating the deep recession and concomitant unemployment 
crisis that already plagued the colonial economy.107 Bereft of any 
means of stemming or regulating these inequities, the colonial 
merchant, manufacturer, farmer, and planter were bonded together in 
loathing British market manipulation.108 
Thus, not surprisingly, the Founding Fathers viewed corporations 
as dangerous organizations that, if not heavily regulated, would 
threaten the very freedom of their fledgling nation.109 Fearing such a 
threat, the original thirteen states adopted constitutional provisions 
that placed strong restrictions on businesses, especially those with the 
greatest potential to capture significant market, economic, and 
political power.110 The Pennsylvania Legislature justified its heavy 
regulation of industry, stating, “A corporation in law is just what the 
incorporating act makes it. It is the creature of the law, and may be 
moulded to any shape or for any . . . purpose that the Legislature may 
deem most conducive to the general good.”111 Hence, from the early 
days of the young republic, corporations were perceived with a 
wariness that prompted and justified aggressive corporate regulation. 
Such wariness and a consequent desire to check corporate 
ambition are not isolated relics of colonial times long past. Near the 
beginning of the twentieth century, even greater social acceptance of 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. 2 MIRIAM BEARD, A HISTORY OF BUSINESS: FROM THE MONOPOLISTS TO THE 
ORGANIZATION MAN 127 (1938). 
 107. HERBERT APTHEKER, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763–1783, at 34 (1960). 
 108. Id. at 34–35. 
 109. ROSE, supra note 104, at 9. 
 110. Id. 
 111. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA UPON THE SUBJECT 
OF THE COAL TRADE 46 (1834). 
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broad regulations of corporate affairs112 emerged in the United States 
following the failure of the Reading Railroad and the subsequent 
failures of hundreds of banks.113 These sudden and calamitous 
economic disasters “shifted the psyche of the American public” 
toward an even greater distrust of corporate behemoths in a way that 
would continue to drive twentieth-century policy and lawmaking 
decades later.114 In 1927, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., proclaimed a sentiment representative of his era, stating, 
“[T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest and has 
been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to 
beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers.”115 
Several years later, after plummeting stock prices on Wall Street 
had signaled the onset of the Great Depression, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress completely reshaped the 
federal government’s role in the U.S. economy by introducing the 
New Deal.116 Historian Ronald Edsforth observes, “At the heart of 
the New Deal reform program was a liberal commitment to make 
federally guaranteed economic security a political right for every 
American citizen.”117 It was envisioned that this security would be 
permanently established through the creation of a broad series of 
regulatory programs and agencies, including the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.118 Because many of these programs and 
agencies continue to play a prominent role in the twenty-first 
century’s American corporate governance regime, political leaders 
 
 112. CRANE BRINTON, II A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 239 (1984) (“By the early twentieth 
century public opinion was ready for increased participation by the national government in the 
regulation of economic life.”).  
 113. Frederic S. Mishkin, Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical 
Perspective, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 69, 86 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 
1991); Lee I. Niedringhaus, The Panic of 1893, FIN. HIST., Winter 1998, at 16, 19. 
 114. Niedringhaus, supra note 113, at 19. 
 115. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 116. RONALD EDSFORTH, THE NEW DEAL: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 1 (2000) (“‘The New Deal’ is what [Franklin Delano Roosevelt], the press, and 
everyone else in the country called the laws Congress began enacting just days after FDR took 
office in the first week of March 1933.”). 
 117. Id. at 2. 
 118. See generally Edwin C. Rozwenc, THE NEW DEAL: REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION, at v 
(1949), reprinted in 8–10 PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (Earl Latham, George Rogers 
Taylor & George F. Whicher eds., 1959) (“The Roosevelt New Deal was a period of 
unparalleled legislative activity . . . [marked] by an unprecedented multiplication of 
administrative rules and regulations.”). 
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calling for a more principles-based approach have condemned that 
regime as an antiquated relic, rooted in a New Deal era that was 
closer in time to the Civil War than to the corporate scandals that 
fueled the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley.119 
Nevertheless, from a purely historical perspective, it appears that 
the greatest economic harm done to U.S. issuers, shareholders, and 
investors actually resulted from the government’s surrender of 
portions of its regulatory power in the days since the New Deal, not 
from its continued imposition of onerous rules-based regulations on 
corporations. For example, in 1983—a half-century after the New 
Deal was instituted—banking institutions successfully lobbied for the 
abrogation of certain government regulations, including restrictions 
blocking their entry into stock brokerage activities.120 This 
deregulation was heralded as a grand leap forward for business and 
investors until just three years later, in 1986, when it led to the 
greatest collapse of U.S. financial institutions since the Great 
Depression.121 From 1986 to 1995, 1,043 savings and loan institutions, 
with combined holdings of over $500 billion, failed.122 The cost of 
resolving this crisis eventually surpassed $190 billion, most of which 
was paid for by taxpayers.123 In this instance, deregulation only 
catalyzed economic growth for a short period before it contributed to 
a devastating economic collapse. 
Still, the savings and loan crisis did not put an end to 
deregulation. In 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,124 which removed the regulatory barriers erected 
after the market crash of 1929 that had segregated banking and stock 
brokering.125 Within months of this deregulation, a feverish outbreak 
of fraudulent mismanagement scandals infected such reputable firms 
as CitiCorp, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Solomon Barney, and 
 
 119. COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 17, at 2. 
 120. ROSE, supra note 104, at 64. 
 121. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and 
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 26–27 (2000). 
 122. Id. at 26. 
 123. JAMES R. BARTH, SUSANNE TRIMBATH & GLENN YAGO, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN 
CRISIS: LESSONS FROM A REGULATORY FAILURE, at xi (2004). 
 124. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
 125. ROSE, supra note 104, at 210. 
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Credit Suisse.126 Some have argued that the spectacular failures of 
Enron and WorldCom, among others, can be traced directly back to 
the deregulation of 1999.127 Whether or not that is the case, a 
substantial historical record documents the negative economic fallout 
from periods of significant deregulation. 
What relevant principles can be drawn from this history? 
Although historical attitudes and events are unlikely to serve as 
dispositive indicators of how well the U.S. legal system would 
accommodate a more principles-based approach to corporate 
governance, they provide several important guideposts for 
comparison. First, Americans’ longstanding apprehension of 
corporate abuses, which has persisted since the earliest days of the 
colonial era, suggests that rules are preferable to principles in 
American corporate governance.128 Rules serve as external legal 
safeguards—as intermediaries at the gates of the market to prevent 
corporate abuses129—and therefore function to assuage individual 
anxieties about prospective abuses. Conversely, soft law principles 
rely on corporate self-regulation. This trust in corporations to govern 
themselves is anathema to U.S. historical attitudes and experiences 
that persist into the twenty-first century:130 nearly three of every four 
Americans reported in 2002 that “business has too much power over 
too many aspects of American life.”131 
Additionally, history has shown that U.S. legislators have 
consistently responded to manifestations of corporate fraud and 
failure with heavy-handed rules and regulation. Such was true at the 
beginning of the twentieth century after the Reading Railroad 
collapse and resultant banking collapses,132 after the market crash of 
1929,133 and at the beginning of the twenty-first century after the 
 
 126. Id. at 210–11. 
 127. Id. at 211. 
 128. Id. at 9. 
 129. 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 98, at 22. 
 130. See GEORGE HORACE GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2002, at 33 
(2003) (noting that a Gallup review of Americans’ attitudes toward corporations revealed that 
“the public has historically held lukewarm feelings toward big business” and a substantial “48% 
say corporations can be trusted ‘only a little’ or ‘not at all’”).  
 131. OTTO LERBINGER, CORPORATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS: INTERACTING WITH INTEREST 
GROUPS, MEDIA, AND GOVERNMENT 352 (2006) (reporting the results of a July 2002 survey). 
 132. Niedringhaus, supra note 113, at 19. 
 133. ROSE, supra note 104, at 209. 
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Enron and WorldCom collapses.134 Therefore, even if a soft law 
principles-based regime were adopted into U.S. law, it seems highly 
probable that were another large-scale corporate scandal to emerge 
and rekindle the frantic flames of anxiety in a spooked American 
populace, the legislative response would be aggressively regulatory 
and unequivocally rules based. Thus, even if some legislative attempt 
were made to institute a soft law corporate governance regime into 
U.S. law, its longevity would appear dubious at best. 
Moreover, soft law has blossomed in the United Kingdom under 
completely different circumstances than those that exist in the United 
States. As one observer has noted, in Europe, “the very idea of soft 
law mechanisms as alternatives or complements to traditional hard 
law arose a decade ago from the acknowledgement that European 
integration had created a fundamental asymmetry between policies 
promoting market efficiency and policies aimed at social 
protection.”135 During the genesis of the European Union, soft law 
was championed as an effective way of unifying divergent national 
perspectives and political systems.136 In the United States, where the 
political system is symmetrical, soft law would offer no such benefit. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom emerged as a soft law pioneer 
during the early period of European Union formation. In 1992, the 
Bank of England and the London Stock Exchange instituted the first 
corporate governance code of the modern era, which was developed 
under the supervision of U.K. corporate luminary Sir Adrian 
Cadbury.137 In effect it was business, not government, that was 
regulating business.138 
Therefore, while the Combined Code traces its history to this 
pivotal time in U.K. and European legal and political history, no 
analogue exists in the modern U.S. experience. The United States has 
never allowed corporate luminaries like Sir Cadbury to form and 
 
 134. See David S. Hilzenrath, Accounting Bill Advances; Senate Panel Backs Broad Measure 
with GOP Help, WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at E1. 
 135. Robilant, supra note 32, at 505. 
 136. Id. at 501–02. 
 137. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 297 (3d ed. 2004). 
The committee that drafted the code is known as the “Cadbury Committee,” and several 
additional governance committees, each chaired by United Kingdom corporate leaders, have 
met to draft and revise governance codes. Id. at 297–98. 
 138. See ACCOUNTING ETHICS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND 
MANAGEMENT, 184 (J. Edward Ketz ed., 2006) (interpreting the Cadbury norms to mean that 
business in the United Kingdom is “largely of a self-regulatory nature”). 
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reform its law. Congressional committees may seek advice and insight 
from such luminaries, but ultimately the rules and regulations come 
from government, principally state governments, and not from chief 
executive officers and boards of directors.139 Because this pattern is so 
well established in U.S. law, and because U.S. shareholders and 
investors are undoubtedly still smarting from the billions of dollars 
lost in corporate abuses since the turn of the century, a soft law 
approach that places code-fashioning authority in the hands of 
corporate luminaries would very likely meet insurmountable public 
opposition. 
B. Cultural Influences 
Just as American history has played a dominant role in shaping 
and preserving U.S. rules-based regulation of business, deep-seated 
and uniquely American cultural values have likewise had a significant 
effect. In particular, the interplay of two American values makes the 
wholesale adoption of a principles-based code almost un-American. 
These values are (1) a fervent belief that corporations are capable of 
moral or immoral action, and (2) an impassioned desire to uphold 
justice, including harsh retributivist justice, as a means of securing 
rightness and fairness. 
Behavioral and sociological research has shown that Americans 
believe corporations are capable of immoral acts.140 Although 
Americans generally support business, they have a strong, distinctly 
negative reaction to corporate misbehavior.141 Public opinion surveys 
witness that Americans view corporate collapse as a byproduct of 
“executives’ greed for money and power and an overall, societal 
weakening of personal values.”142 At the time Enron and WorldCom 
were imploding, a majority of Americans spoke of the crumbling 
corporate culture in moral terms, believing that former President Bill 
 
 139. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address to the 2007 US-
EU Corporate Governance Conference (Oct. 9, 2007) (transcript on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (“In America, our system of federal regulation has been built upon a foundation of 
laws and rules established by 50 state governments as well as U.S. territories and their 
respective courts of law.”). 
 140. See Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual 
Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 152 (1989) (citing research showing that the public 
viewed corporate crime as widespread and deserving of punishment). 
 141. Id. at 152, 162. 
 142. Diane Stafford, We May Be Closer Than We Think, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 11, 2004, at 
C1. 
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Clinton was “at least partially responsible [for the scandals] because 
of the climate he set in office with his moral failings.”143 Importantly, 
empirical studies also show that even when corporate and individual 
misdeeds are identical, Americans hold corporations to a higher 
standard, judge them to be more reckless and more morally wrong in 
their behaviors, and wish to see them punished more severely.144 
This strong negative response to corporations may be partly 
explained by Americans’ perception of corporations as independent 
actors, capable of making moral choices but possessing more money 
and power than an everyday individual. In 1790, James Wilson, an 
early U.S. statesman and signatory of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution, declared that corporations are 
“moral persons” though “not in a state of natural liberty, because 
their actions are cognizable by the superior power of the state.”145 
Several years later, the Supreme Court of the United States echoed 
similar sentiments in the pivotal case Trustees of Dartmouth College 
v. Woodward.146 The Court opined, “A corporation is an artificial 
being . . . [which] possesses only those properties which the charter of 
its creation confers upon it . . . . Among the most important [of these 
is] . . . individuality . . . .”147 Thus, a belief that corporations are 
persons, capable of moral and immoral acts, has been preached by 
important legal and political leaders in formative eras of U.S. history. 
Other sources offer further evidence of this uniquely American 
value. Authorities in business and industry have also attributed 
personhood and morality to the corporation. Indeed, the notion that 
the “corporation [is] a moral agent and [a] fit subject for 
punishment”148 pervades American “textbooks and syllabi of courses 
in business management . . . marketing, and public policy . . . [and] 
controls the thinking in the majority of many business ethics 
centers.”149 Business expositor John David Rose observes in 
unmistakably moral terms that “the Ten Commandments could be 
 
 143. David W. Moore, Little Political Fallout from Business Scandals, GALLUP NEWS 
SERVICE, July 8, 2002, http://www.gallup.com/poll/6340/Little-Political-Fallout-From-Business-
Scandals.aspx?version=print. 
 144. Hans & Ermann, supra note 140, at 162. 
 145. 2 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA, GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN LIFE 173 (1968). 
 146. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 147. Id. at 636. 
 148. Donna Card Charron, Stockholders and Stakeholders: The Battle for Control of the 
Corporation, 27 CATO J. 1, 9 (2007). 
 149. Id. at 1. 
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considered the final word of what is right and wrong in business as in 
life.”150 American CEO Charles Fulweiler describes the abusive way 
corporations have treated the American public thus: “It is a never-
ending source of amazement to me that we are cheated, lied to, 
murdered and, in general, treated like mindless supplicants . . . .”151 
Contrast Fulweiler’s words with these words of the profoundly 
influential English jurist Sir Edward Coke: corporations “cannot 
commit treason nor be outlawed, or excommunicated, for they have 
no souls.”152 Other eminent English jurists and state executives have 
agreed.153 Perhaps Fulweiler’s strong diction and the words of the 
American judges, statesmen, and business leaders cited in this Section 
are thus evidence not only of a fervent cultural belief that 
corporations are akin to individuals and capable of immoral acts, but 
also of a purely American phenomenon that was not inherited from 
Britain. 
Indeed, more than any other nation, the United States relies on 
lawyers, legal threats, and courts of justice to implement public 
policies and to resolve business disputes.154 The range of matters that 
can be resolved in U.S. courts is “broader than in other nations and 
growing each year.”155 American culture has also long been imbued 
with a strong sense that punishment must be exacted in the U.S. 
courts,156 which are plaintiff-friendly by design157 and offer a breadth 
 
 150. ROSE, supra note 104, at 71. 
 151. Id. at 2. 
 152. PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, ONE WITH NINEVEH: POLITICS, 
CONSUMPTION, AND THE HUMAN FUTURE 295 (2004). 
 153. Roger Manwood, Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer under appointment from Queen 
Elizabeth I, opined that corporations “were invisible, immortal, and . . . had no soul, and 
therefore no subpoena lieth against them, because they have no conscience . . . .” FRANKLIN 
FISKE HEARD, CURIOSITIES OF THE LAW REPORTERS 79 (1871) (quoting from a description of 
Manwood’s opinion in an English Law Reporter). Edward, First Baron Thurlow, attorney and 
Lord Chancellor of Great Britain under four prime ministers in the eighteenth century, argued 
that “[c]orporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned . . . .” 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (1979). Thurlow also famously said, “Did you ever 
expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be 
kicked?” MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1977). 
 154. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3–4 (2002); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL 
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001). 
 155. BURKE, supra note 154, at 3. 
 156. See id. (“[S]ome studies suggest that those supposedly stoic pioneers of frontier 
America were far more inclined to sue than their allegedly litigation-loving descendants.”). 
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of procedural advantages unmatched in the courts of many other 
nations because they include civil juries, broad discovery privileges, 
broader access to courts and lawyers, contingent fee arrangements, 
and the absence of “loser-pays” cost-shifting rules.158 American legal 
culture is likewise rich in constitutional, statutory, and common law 
jurisprudence that generates an abundance of personal rights and 
facilitates the litigation necessary to protect them.159 Perhaps this 
explains why approximately 92 million lawsuits are filed each year in 
the United States.160 Nearly 70,000 of these are liability suits, 
whereas—for the sake of comparison—only 200 liability suits are filed 
annually in the United Kingdom.161 
The U.S. legal culture, however, is not merely preoccupied with 
providing plaintiffs access to the courts. It is also deeply concerned 
with the aggressive punishment of convicted wrongdoers. As Marie 
Gottschalk explains, “[T]he United States . . . has built a carceral state 
that is unprecedented among Western countries[,] . . . distinguish[ed] 
[by] the sheer size of its prison and jail population; its reliance on 
harsh, degrading sanctions; and the persistence and centrality of the 
death penalty.”162 The proportion of adults behind bars is higher in 
the United States than in any other nation of the world.163 And as 
James Whitman notes, relative to the legal systems of Europe, 
“America’s legal system is harsher . . . in all respects [because] 
 
 157. See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 16 (2004) (noting the many “unique causes of action available in [the United 
States], as well as the distinctive plaintiff-friendly nature of the US legal system”). 
 158. Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in 
International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 501, 502 (1993). 
 159. Rogers M. Smith, Rights, in A COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 595, 595–98 
(Richard Wrightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg eds., 1995) (observing that the United States 
began as the culmination of claims for British recognition of individual and collective American 
rights, that Americans have made many rights claims through much of U.S. history, and that 
American courts and legislatures continue to play an essential role in securing those rights). 
 160. DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 411 
(2004). 
 161. PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF 
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 47 (1991). 
 162. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006). Gottschalk continues: “Nearly one in fifty people in the 
United States, excluding children and the elderly, is behind bars today.” Id. Gottschalk argues 
that America’s punitive penal policy is the product of several forces, including uniquely 
American historical events. Id. at 4. 
 163. Id. at 1. The incarceration rate in the United States has increased more than five-fold 
since 1973. Id. 
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America criminalizes a wider variety of conduct than Europe 
does[,] . . . subjects more classes of people to potential criminal 
liability[,] . . . [and] the punishments it imposes are far less flexible 
and less individualized . . . .”164 Additionally, American laws are more 
detailed, complex, and prescriptive than those of many countries, and 
U.S. legal penalties are often more severe.165 The rate of incarceration 
in the United States is the highest in the industrialized world, and 
public opinion polls indicate that Americans are becoming 
increasingly likely to support punitive measures like “three strikes” 
sentencing laws.166 Relative to the laws of many other nations, U.S. 
law has trended toward ever-increasing harshness in its criminal 
policies.167 
For example, in Roper v. Simmons,168 Justice John Paul Stevens 
opined on “the stark reality that the United States is the only country 
in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty.”169 Although the Supreme Court went on to hold that 
the execution of individuals who were under the age of eighteen when 
they committed capital crimes is unconstitutional,170 the U.S. legal 
culture continues to be infused with retributivist justifications for 
criminal punishment.171 
Less severe forms of punishment than the death penalty likewise 
characterize a brand of retribution that is unmistakably American. It 
has been estimated that the amount of taxpayer dollars paid in tort 
punitive damages is 2.5 percent of the gross national product in the 
 
 164. Daniel Statman, The Historical and Cultural Roots of Harsh Punishment, 17 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 299, 299–300 (2005) (reviewing JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003)). 
 165. KAGAN, supra note 154, at 3. 
 166. Id. 
 167. WHITMAN, supra note 164, at 3. 
 168. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 169. Id. at 575. 
 170. Id. at 574. 
 171. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (noting retributivism is the 
“primary justification for the death penalty”); Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: 
Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 117 (2000) (attributing the 
decline of probation and parole in the American justice system to retributivism); Robert J. 
Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American Justice at the End of 
the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507–08 (1997) (book review) (“[S]ince the mid-
seventies retribution has come back with a vengeance, enjoying today a greater prominence in 
public discourse over crime and punishment than at any other time in post-war America.”). 
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United States, compared to 0.5 percent in the United Kingdom.172 
Additionally, although “three-strikes” laws, mandatory minimum 
sentences, and “truth in sentencing” laws are often criticized for being 
excessively punitive, U.S. lawmakers have been undeterred from 
making them available to courts across the United States.173 
In light of these distinctively American notions of rights, 
adequate due process in the courts, and retributive punishment, a soft 
law system built solely on principles and “best practices” appears 
completely incompatible with American legal culture. Under a 
principles-based regime like the Combined Code, shareholders may 
only punish the corporation by moving their assets elsewhere. But if 
the corporation is viewed through the lens of American culture as an 
immoral “person” that has committed fraud or gross negligence 
leading to significant losses in shareholder investments, then the 
corporation must be punished directly. Once a shareholder’s funds 
are lost, punitive justice will not be served by transferring the 
remainder of that shareholder’s shares elsewhere. Hence, without 
rules, without hard law that prohibits transgression and justifies its 
reprimand, no punishment that satisfies the American cultural sense 
of retributivist justice can be meted out. Principles-based regulation is 
therefore anathema to deeply seated and quintessentially American 
notions of retributivist punishment for immoral acts. 
CONCLUSION 
American financial and political leaders have assessed the 
feasibility of overhauling the U.S. regulatory framework of corporate 
governance by adopting a more principles-based approach. Many of 
these leaders believe this overhaul would create something similar to 
and perhaps patterned after the United Kingdom’s Combined Code. 
This Note has argued that this aspiration is fundamentally flawed and 
patently impractical. America’s longstanding, firmly fixed fear of 
corporate excesses, combined with its strong cultural disdain for 
corporate misbehavior and its espousal of just deserts punishment, 
make it highly unlikely the American public and their representatives 
in Congress would ever replace legislative rules with “best practices” 
 
 172. Punitive Damages: Tort Reform & FDA Defense: Hearing on S. 671 and S. 672 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 112 (1995) (statement of Theodore Olson). 
 173. HENRY M. WROBLESKI & KAREN M. HESS, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 467 (8th ed. 2006). 
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principles. Moreover, even if principles were to find a foothold in 
U.S. corporate regulation, the consistent history of aggressive 
congressional responses to corporate misdeeds and collapses suggests 
that once the first corporate crisis surfaced, Congress would eradicate 
those principles with aggressive and prophylactic rules-based 
regulation. 
